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Snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park
. INTRODUCTION
At Voyageurs National
Park, along the northern border of
Minnesota, visitors can see bald
eagles and gray wolves in the wild.2
As of fall 1997, visitors can no
longer use snowmobiles to reach
some of the remote areas where
these animals live.3 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
trail plan generated by the park
superintendent, the National Park
Service (NPS), and the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), despite
the objections of a group of
snowmobilers.' This Note will
discuss the complex litigation
surrounding the decision and how
restricting snowmobile access in
the "watery maze" that makes up
Voyageurs Park's over thirty lakes
and nine hundred islands might
affect similar conflicts between
outdoor recreationists and environ-
mental groups in other national
parks.'
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
The litigation involved three
separate cases and three visits by the
same parties to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 6  Each set of
cases centered on the issue of
snowmobiling in Voyageurs Na-
tional Park in Minnesota - its
environmental impact on endan-
gered species,' NPS' authority to
regulate or ban snowmobile use in
WINTER WONDERLAND: INTERVENTION,
ENDANGERED SPECIES AND SNOWMOBILING
IN VOYAGEURS NATIONAL PARK
Mausolfv. Babbitt'
by Rebecca Williams
125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Mausolf I],
Mausolfv. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1297 (1996) (hereinafter Mauisolffl].
Mausolf IV, 125 F.3d at 670.
' Id. The plaintiffs were Jeffirey Mausolf, William Kuhlberg, Arlys Strehlo, and the Minnesota United Snowmobilers
Association.
Mausolf 1, 85 F.3d at 1296.
See Mausolfv. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996) [hereinafterMausolfll], rev'd, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997);
Mausolfv. Babbitt, 158 F.R.D. 143 (D. Minn. 1994) [hereinafterMautsolffl, rev'd, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996); Voyageurs
Region National Park Association v. Lujan, No. 4-90-434, 1991 WL 343370 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 1991), aff'd, 966 F.2d 424(8th Cir. 1992).
Voyageurs Region National Park Association v. Lujan, No. 4-90-434, 1991 WL 343370 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 1991), aff'd,966 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1992).
Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996) [Mausolf III], rev'd, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997).
Mausolf v. Babbitt, 158 F.R.D. 143 (D. Minn. 1994) [Mausolf l], rev'd, 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
See 36 C.F.R. § 2.18(c) (1994).
Mausolf ill, 913 F. Supp. at 1338. See also MausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 663.
The originating legislation instructed the park superintendent to include snowmobiling provisions in the park's development
plan. 16 U.S.C. § 160h (1994). The 1991 regulations explicitly allowed snowmobiling in the park. 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b)(1994). The same regulations authorized closing areas ofthe park if suggested by "park management objectives." 36 C.F.R.§ 7.33(b)(3).
Alanso/f III, 913 F. Supp. at 1338. The investigations and reports include NPS' 1989 draft trail plan and 1990
environmental assessment of lake-surface snowmobiling's impact, along with FWS' 1989 and 1990 biol.ogical opinions. See
id
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the park' and the standing of an
environmental group to intervene
on the government's behalf,9 re-
spectively.
Snowmobiling, although
generally prohibited in national
parks, 0 was a popular form of
winter recreation in Voyageurs even
before its opening in 1975." Both
the park's originating legislation
and NPS regulations issued in 1991
allowed snowmobiling on frozen
lake surfaces and trails.12 A series of
NPS and FWS reports and opinions
provided a basis for the 1991
regulations that determined that
snowmobiling did not have a
significant impact on park wildlife,
including the threatened bald eagle
and gray wolf populations."
When NPS issued the 1991
regulations, the Voyageurs Region
National Park Association (Asso-
ciation) filed suit in Minnesota
federal court, claiming that the
regulations were illegal on the
grounds that NPS had not specifi-
cally prepared a wilderness plan to
check the effects of the regula-
Vol. 5 * No. 3
tions." The District Court ordered
NPS to promulgate a wilderness
plan for the park within one year,
but declined to enjoin snowmobiling
in the park until a wilderness
recommendation was made.' 5 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's deci-
sion, stating that the agency's action
was justified under the park's
enabling legislation, which. more
specifically governed the park
superintendent's decision whether
to allow snowmobiling than the
Wilderness Act did.' 6
In 1991, while working on
a draft wilderness plan as ordered,'"
NPS requested a "biological opin-
ion" from FWS to ascertain the
effects on the park's gray wolf, bald
eagle, and general animal popula-
tions of a proposed closing of some
overland park areas to
snowmobiling.' 8  The opinion,
issued in March 1992, concluded
that the proposed wilderness plan,
which limited the access previously
available to snowmobilers, would
not "jeopardize the animals' sur-
vival or adversely affect their
critical habitats." The opinion
warned, however, that the cumula-
tive effects of frequent snowmobile
intrusion into areas where wolves
hunted prey could create "signifi-
cant negative effects." 20  The
opinion directed avoiding these
effects by closing more overland
trails, lakes and lakeshores to
snowmobile access than NPS had
suggested in the draft wilderness
plan.21
Issued on December 16,
1992, the final wilderness plan
mandated closing sixteen of the
park's lake bays and certain
shoreline areas to motorized access
during the winter.22 NPS justified
the closings under a provision that
gave the park superintendent au-
thority to restrict snowmobiling for
wildlife-management purposes.
The restricted areas consisted of
6,541 acres, comprising seven
percent of the park's total water
acreage and three percent of the
park's total acreage. 24 The superin-
" MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 664. The park's enabling legislation required a wilderness plan for the park's development within
four years ofthe park's establishment in 1971. 16 U.S.C. § 160f(b). The Association argued thatNPS management policies
required any areas understudy for a wilderness designation be managed as actual wilderness areas pending formal designation
as such, therefore making use of any motorized vehicle within such areas prohibited as mandated by the Wilderness Act.
Voyageurs Region National Park Association v. Lujan, No. 4-90-434, 1991 WL 343370 at 3 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c)
(1994)).
" Voyageurs Region National Park Associationv. Lujan, No. 4-90-434, 1991 WL 343370 at 15.
1 Voyageurs Region National Park Association v. Lujan, 966 F.2d at 428. The court said that the enabling legislation
evidenced Congress' intent that snowmobiling could be allowed at Voyageurs if, as did happen, the park superintendent found
that snowmobiling would not damage the area so as to preclude designation as a wilderness area. Id. at 427. The court held
that this specific permission to allow snowmobiling overrides the general provisions of the Wilderness Act to maintain
undesignated areas as wilderness. Id. at 428. Therefore, NPS' allowing snowmobiling did not violate the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review imposed on federal agency action. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(A)(2) (1994).
" See MausolflII, 913 F. Supp. at 1339. The plan suggested limiting onland snowmobiling on the Kabetogama Peninsula
to a 12-foot-wide trail while allowing continued access to all major lake surfaces. Id.
'
8 MausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 664. The biological opinion from FWS is a requirement for any federal agency contemplating action
"likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of [critical] habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). A biological opinion is a "written statement setting
forth [FWS'] opinion, and a summary ofthe information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects
the species or its critical habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 664.
* Id. The chance that passing snowmobiles would disrupt wolves hunting and feeding along shorelines was mentioned in a
1990 environmental assessment oftrail plans issued by NPS. Mausolfl, 913 F. Supp. at 1338. The report went on to dismiss
any long-term dangers of such access by explaining that the wolves' hunting and feeding time, evenings and early mornings,
did not coincide with the presence of winter recreationists. Id. The assessment stated that the detrimental impact on wolves
had not been formally studied, but that the wolf population had remained relatively stable over the first 15 years of the park's
existence. Id.
21 Id.
2 MausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 664. See also MausolfII, 913 F. Supp. at 1340 (noting that Park Superintendent Ben Clary
expressed disagreement with the plan, but felt legally obligated to comply with the biological opinion's suggestion about
expanding the closings).
n 36 C.F.R § 7.33(b)(3) (1994). The statute reads, "The Superintendent may determine yearly opening and closing dates
for snowmobile use, and temporarily close trailsor lake surfaces, taking into consideration public safety, wildlife management,
weather and park management objectives."
24 MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 664 n.5.
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tendent renewed the closure order
in 1993 and 1994.25 In 1994 and
1996, after becoming aware of
snowmobilers' objections to the
closures, FWS supplemented its
biological opinion with an addi-
tional explanation for the restric-
tions and revised its initial inciden-
tal take statement, reducing the
allowed number of incidental
takings of gray wolves from six to
two per year.26
On January 1, 1994, the
current plaintiffs/appellees filed a
complaint in Minnesota federal
district court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against NPS,
Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt, Voyageurs National Park,
and its Superintendent Ben Clary.27
They alleged that the FWS biologi-
cal opinion and supplements did
not show sufficient supporting
evidence for the closings and that
the closings violated the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review
for agency action. 28 The plaintiffs
were a group of snowmobile
enthusiasts represented by Jeffrey
Mausolf.2
The Voyageurs Region
National Park Association, the
current appellant, moved to inter-
vene in the snowmobilers' suit on
behalf of the government.30  It
asserted an interest in "restricting
the use of snowmobiles in the park,
and in maintaining and preserving
the pristine nature of this Nation's
wildlife and wilderness refuges."3 1
The same group sued to force NPS
to promulgate the wilderness plan
for the park in the lawsuit described
above.32
The District Court denied
the Association's motion to inter-
vene on the grounds that it had not
identified a separate, private basis
for its involvement that was not
already covered by the government's
presence in the suit.33 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit reversed the
District Court and held that the
Association had standing to inter-
vene.34  The Court said that the
Association met the Article III
requirements for standing and
proved that the government might
not adequately represent its inter-
ests.35 The Court found that specific
affidavits from Association mem-
bers showed "concrete, imminent
and redressable injuries in fact,"
similar to how the snowmobilers
alleged certain injuries would result
from the closings. 6 In addition, the
23 Id. at 664.
26 Id. at 664-65. The 1994 supplement stated that FWS' goal was to reduce "adverse human/wolfcontact," and that limiting
snowmobile access would limit the ability of humans to reach remote habitat areas and "intentionally or unwittingly" cause
harm. Id. The 1996 supplement cited five takings and anecdotal evidence of harassment tojustify the reduced number of
permissible takings. Id. FWS must issue an incidental take statement when a proposed agency action is found to possibly
result in unintentional taking of individual members of an endangered or threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1994).
A "taking" is "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or, collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
27 Mausolfll, 913 F. Supp. at 1340. The defendants also included Roger Kennedy, the Director of NPS, and Mollie Beattie,
the Director of FWS. Id. at 1134. See also Afausolfl, 158 F.R.D. at 144.
28 ausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 665.
29 Id. at 663.
s0 MausolfI, 158 F.R.D. at 144. Other intervenors included the Sierra Club, North Star Chapter, Humane Society of the
United States, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, National Park and Conservation Association, Izaak Walton
League of America. Mausolfl, 85 F.3d at 1295.
fMausolfII, 85 F.3d at 1295.
3 See supra notes 14-16.
* Mausolfl, 158 F.RD. at 148. The court characterized the Association's interest as general and sharedby thegeneral public,
therefore adequately represented by NPS under parens patriae, a doctrine that the government represents all of the interests
of its citizens. Id. at 147. A separate interest is required for intervention of right by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2),
which sets out a three-part test: "1) the party must have a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation; 2) that
interest mustbe one that might be impairedby the disposition ofthe litigation; 3) the interest must not be adequately protected
by the existing parties." Id. at 146 (quoting Mille Lacs Band of Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1993)).
' Mausolfl, 85 F.3d at 1304.
* MausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 665. The Article III test requires that a party meet three elements: 1) suffer an "injury in fact"; 2)
establish a causal connection between the alleged injury and the conduct being challenged; 3) show that the injury is likely to
be redressedby a favorable decision. Mausolfll, 85 F.3d at 1301 (citing Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 at 560-
61(1992)).
6 Mausolfll, 85 F.3d at 1301-02. The opinion describes the affidavit of Jennifer Hunt, the Association's Executive Director,
in which she averred that she visited the park at least twice a year and planned specific return visits. Other detailed affidavits
submitted that allowing snowmobiling would lessen the members' "enjoyment of the Park's tranquility and beauty." Id.
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Court held that the Association
rebutted the parens patriae pre-
sumption of adequate representa-
tion by the government.37
While its appeal on inter-
vention was pending, and ulti-
mately granted, the Association
watched the original suit proceed to
the District Court. On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the
Court ruled for the snowmobilers,
holding that the closure order was
based on insufficient evidence,
"little more than speculation,"
about the threats to endangered
species from snowmobiling." The
Court based its decision on a
standard from the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) regulations
requiring the "best scientific and
commercial data available." 39 After
the District Court issued its ruling,
the Association filed a timely
appeal in hopes that the Eighth
Circuit would grant its appeal on
intervention. 40
The Eighth Circuit did
grant the Association intervenor
status, as described above, but the
government dismissed its appeal of
the District Court's decision grant-
ing summary judgment to the
snowmobilers. 41 Thus, the Associa-
tion became the only party appeal-
ing the judgment, but it had not been
a party before the summary
judgment.
On appeal, the
snowmobilers first claimed that the
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
appeal because the Association was
not a party to the litigation until
after the filing period for an appeal
expired.42 The snowmobilers also
argued that because the government
dismissed its appeal, it had essen-
tially abandoned the regulations,
leaving the Association without
standing to force the government to
reinstate the Park closings.43
In contrast, the Association
argued that its "interests in observ-
ing and enjoying park wildlife"
gave it continued standing to
appeal. It also claimed that NPS
had sufficient evidence and author-
ity for the closings under the
organic act creating NPS and the
national park system, and the
regulations governing all national
parks and Voyageurs Park specifi-
cally, in addition to the ESA
regulations cited by the District
Court." In response, the
snowmobilers argued that the park
superintendent did not have author-
ity to issue an order without a stated
time limit. 6
The District Court denied
the Association's motion to inter-
vene and ruled in favor of the
snowmobilers that the park closures
were unwarranted. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
both decisions.4
The Eighth Circuit held that
when the defending intervenor was
granted standing to sue after the
initial judgment and the original
defendant dismissed its appeal, the
intervenor continued to have stand-
ing because it could show an Article
III case or controversy that differed
in interests from the original
defendant's. 48  In addition, the
Court held that because NPS had a
reasonable basis for Park closures
and the closures were reviewed
annually, the regulations governing
NPS and the individual Park
granted the Park Superintendent the
discretion to temporarily close areas
of the Park.
" Id. at 1303. The court noted that the enabling act listed both recreational and conservationist purposes for the park's
establishment, then stated, "these purposes will sometimes, unavoidably conflict, and even the Government cannot always
adequately represent conflicting interests at the same time." Id. The Association's interest was conservation, while the
government had an interest in promoting recreation and tourism. Id.
" MausolflI, 913 F. Supp. at 1344. The court stated: "FWS and the NPS simply contend that temporary displacements of
these species may evolve into permanent displacements . . . There is absolutely no evidence in the record to support this
proposition." Id.
3 Id. at 1343 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (1996)).
40 MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 665.
41 Id. at 666.
42 Id.
4 Id.
4 Id. at 667.
4 Id. at 668. See 16 U.S.C. § 1, 3 (1994), 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (1994), and 36 C.F.R. §7.33(b)(3) (1994).
46 MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 669. The stated authority for park superintendent to issue the closings was 36 C.F.R § 7.33(b)(3),
which governs yearly opening and closing dates and other park regulations. See supra note 23. The snowmobilers asserted
that the lack of a stated time limit moved the challenged closings outside the realm of the provision. MausolfIV, 125 F.3d
at 669.
a Mausolfl, 125 F.3d at 665, 670.
48 Id. at 667.
49 Id. at 670.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Intervention and Appeal
An important feature of the
Eighth Circuit's decision inMausolf
IV was its acceptance of the
Association's effort to proceed
with an appeal of the District
Court's decision against NPS
despite the Association's absence at
the district level. The choice to
allow the appeal involved combin-
ing two separate tests and the case
law surrounding them: the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)
test for intervention of right and the
Article III standing requirements.s0
The language of Rule
24(a)(2) does not require parties to
meet the Article III standing
requirements." In Diamond v.
Charles, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Courts of Appeals
differ in their interpretations of the
question whether intervenors must
meet the Article III standing
requirements along with Rule
24(a)(2). 52 But the Diamond court
refused to resolve the issue."
Complex standing law
emerged when Congress began to
create statutory rights and to
recognize the practicality of allow-
ing groups or individuals to sue to
protect the public's rights. 54 The
prior practice was not to question a
party's standing to sue, but to
decide whether the party had a
private cause of action." The
change emerged from Congress'
expansion of social and civil rights
from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1970s.6 Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in
1966 dealing with compulsory
party joinder, class actions and
intervention of right, combined
with expanded public rights, cre-
ated a fertile environment for a
boom in public law litigation."
In the mid-1970s, the
judiciary began to narrow the test
for standing to restrict the growth of
public law litigation.s" The
Supreme Court developed a more
precise test for standing, narrowing
the "injury-in-fact" test stated in
Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp.5 9
Courts gave more emphasis to
prudential standing requirements to
further protect their time and
resources. 6
In contrast to the growth in
judicial interpretation of standing
requirements, conclusive applica-
50 As stated supra notes 33 and 35, the Rule 24(a) criteria include: (1) a recognized interest in the subject matter that (2) might
be impaired by the disposition of the litigation and (3) is not adequately protected by the existing parties. Article III of the U.S.
Constitution requires that to have standing, a party must show: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the alleged
injury and the conduct being challenged, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
" Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 415 (1991).
2 476 U.S. 54,68 n.21 (1986).
Id. at 68-69.
4 Tobias, supra note 51, at 424.
" Id. at 423-24. The private interests spring from common law claims like tort or contract. Id. at 419. Public law litigation
often involves more abstract interests and attempts to deal with whole branches of government policy or practice, such as
reforming institutions like prisons, or challenging administrative agency actions. Id. at 419-20.
56 Id. at 421.
7 Id. at 422-23. Tobias concluded that the committee probably did not draft the amendments with enabling the expansion of
public law litigation in mind. Id. at 431. See Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 19, 39 F.R.D. 89 (1966); Rule 23, Id. at
98; and Rule 24(a)(2), Id. at 109.
" Tobias, supra note 51, at 425.
5 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Article III test used today requires plaintiffs to show the following:
that they have suffered some actual or threatened harm, which is "distinct and palpable," not abstract,
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged unlawful
behavior of the defendant. Finally, there must be a substantial likelihood that plaintiff's injury will be
redressed by a favorable determination.
Tobias, supra note 51, at 425 (citing, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, Ill S.Ct. 1661, 1667 (1991); Primate
Protection Leaguev. TulaneEduc. Fund, I11 S.Ct. 1700,1704 (1991); Whitmorev. Arkansas, 110 S.Ct. 1717,1723 (1990);
Asarco, Inc. V. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,612-13 (1989); Allenv. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751(1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 100 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
1 Tobias, supra note 51, at 426. The prudential requirements are separate from Article III requirements but are as important
to parties asserting standing. Generally, prudential standards require that parties assert only their own interests, not those of
third parties (see, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991); United States Dep't of Labor v.
Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990); and Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58 (1984));
and that parties assert specific questions, not generalized issues better suited for legislation (see, e.g., Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)).
MELPR 169
Vol. 5 * No. 3
tion of Rule 24(a)(2) after the 1966
amendments was lacking. 61 The
Diamond court acknowledged that
lower federal courts were left to
interpret the Rule.62 The results had
been inharmonious, with those
circuits that required meeting both
standing and the intervention
requirements not clearly articulat-
ing the relationship between the
two. 63 Generally, courts did not
invoke standing requirements
against intervenors or explain the
relevance of standing to interven-
tion of right." The courts that
found a connection between the
two tests applied them in differing
degrees: requiring more than stand-
ing,' requiring an interest similar
to standing,' or applying pruden-
tial standing limitations to would-
be intervenors. 61 InMausolflV, the
Eighth Circuit faced this state of
confusion about what is actually
required to intervene of right and
what a party granted intervenor
status must show on appeal when
the original party on whose side the
intervenor entered is no longer
present.
The snowmobilers cited
Diamond, the leading Supreme
Court case on the issue of appeal
and intervention, to support the
proposition that the Association
lost its right to appeal when NPS
dropped its appeal, signaling NPS'
abandonment of the regulation at
issue."
In Diamond, the intervenor
was a pediatrician who, along with
the state of Illinois, defended a suit
brought by abortion providers to
enjoin enforcement of four sections
of the Illinois Abortion Law of
1975 .69 The District Court enjoined
the operation of sections providing
for criminal liability for performing
abortions under certain circum-
stances and requiring dispensation
of certain information to patients. 0
The State did not appeal from the
permanent injunctions upheld by
the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.n The intervenor filed
timely notice of appeal with the
United States Supreme Court,
supported by a "letter of interest"
from the State, saying that the State,
though not appealing, continued as a




Diamond's contention that the letter
signified a recognizable continued
State interest in the statute and said
that its decision not to appeal
amounted to an acceptance of the
District Court's decision." Without
the State continuing the case, the
Court found that Diamond lacked
Article III standing because no
"case" or "controversy" existed.
The Court also found
Diamond's claims of an "injury in
fact," as required by Article III, to be
insufficient." The intervenor
claimed an interest as a pediatrician
in that with fewer abortions per-
formed, he would gain patients
63 Tobias, supra note 51, at 434. The Supreme Court's rare confrontations with Rule 24(a)(2) left decisions that were fact-
specific and minimally instructive as to application of the Rule. Id. at 432. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132-36 (1967); Donaldsonv. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528 (1972); and Trbovichv. United
States, 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
6 Tobias, supra note 51, at 434.
63 Id. at 436.
* Id. at 441-42. Compare Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 1991); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196
(7th Cir. 1979); USPS v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978); and United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 559 F.2d
509, 521 (9th Cir. 1977) (all stating standing not necessary for intervention) with United States v. Board of School
Commissioners, 446 F.2d 573,577(7th Cir. 1979) (stating generally that intervention standards are more liberal than standing
requirements).
6 See United Statesv. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986).
" See Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Howard v. McLucas, 782
F.2d 956, 962 n. 1(11 th Cir. 1986); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985);
and New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464-65 (5th Cir. 1984).
" See Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (1Ith Cir. 1988); Chilesv. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1212
(11th Cir. 1989); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592,602 (3d Cir. 1987); and Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302,
309 (9th Cir. 1989).
" MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 661, 666.
6 Diamond, 476 U.S. 54, 56 (the sections are codified as ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, para. 81-21 to 81-34 (1992)).
70 Id. at 60-61.
7' Id. See 749 F.2d 452 (1984).
72 Id.
n Id. at 63.
" Id. See supra note 35 for the Article III requirements. The "case" or "controversy" requirement "ensures the presence of
the 'concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues."' Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
7' Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65.
170 MELPR
Snwmbii in VoI~l N[ i t P
from the increase in live births. 6
The Court called this interest
"speculative", and also rejected his
asserted interests as a member of
the medical profession and father of
a minor daughter who would be
entitled to parental notification
under the abortion law." The Court
noted that Article III did not
provide a forum for legislation of
moral values and that Diamond's
concerns did not rise to the level of
a protected interest in the statute.78
The Diamond Court justi-
fied its refusal to recognize the
intervenor's right to appeal by
expressing concern that allowing
the appeal could stifle independent
state action. 9 It explained that to
allow a private citizen to appeal the
injunction of a statute in the absence
of the government amounted to an
attempt to enforce private prefer-
ences against statutes that emerged
from the democratic process.80 The
Court said that the State alone
reserved the power to legislate.8 '
The State's decision to abandon
enforcement of the statute in
accordance with the injunction
could not be revoked by a private
citizen who supported the statute.
As will be discussed later,
the Mausolf IV court was the first
case to explicitly limit the applica-
tion of Diamond's ruling about the
right of intervenors to appeal in
absence of the original litigant on
whose side intervention occurred.
B. Statutory Authority for Park
Closings
The standard for rejecting
an administrative agency's actions
is high, as established by case law
and statutory mandate. The court
must uphold the agency action
unless it finds the action "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with
law." The standard allows courts
to defer to the expertise of the
agencies, which are created in order
to resolve issues that fall under their
statutory authority.84  The Eighth
Circuit held in Voyageurs Region
Nat I Park Ass'n v. Lujan that it
would uphold regulations "reason-
ably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation."8 TheMausolf
IV court cited a standard that only
implausible explanations that run
counter to available evidence may
be struck down. 6
The Mausolf III opinion
questioned NPS' authority under
the ESA for the park closings.87 A
look at the origins and history of the
ESA and NPS provides a basis for
understanding the subsequent opin-
ion.
Congress enacted the ESA
in 1973 to protect certain individual.
species from endangerment and
extinction.88 The FWS administers
the statute, which explains the
agency's involvement in the
Voyageurs Park trail plan via the
biological opinion.89 The agency
can veto federal action by asserting
that the proposed action would
jeopardize a listed species; the
agency is also charged with
monitoring and limiting takings of
protected species. 0 Commentators
praise the ESA for its de facto
imposition of an ecosystem overlay
in areas where listed species live,
helping to dissolve political and
managerial boundaries between
agencies and to establish a broader
basis for biodiversity conserva-
tion.9' Shortcomings of the statute
76 Id. at 66.
" Id. at 66-67.
78 Id.
7 Id. at 65.
8 Id.
81 Id.
I See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1994).
83 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
1MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 667.
85 966 F.2d 424, 427 (1992) (citing Arkansas v. Block, 825 F.2d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973))).
* MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 669 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'nv. StateFarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,42(1983)).
* 913 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
* 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
16U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a). Seegenerally,Frederico Cheever,An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings
in Section 9 ofthe Endangered SpeciesAct ofl973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO.
L. REV. 109 (1991) and Thomas France & Jack Tuholske, Stay the Hand: New Directions for the Endangered SpeciesAct,
7 PuB. LAND L. REv. 1 (1986).
"I Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law ofEcosystem Management, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 293,
308 (1994).
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are that the single-species approach
to conservation does not match the
objectives of true biodiversity and
that it only protects species that are
already almost extinctY9
Specifically, the provisions
that affected the MausolfII and IV
cases cover FWS' obligation to
issue biological opinions.93 Section
7 of the ESA prohibits federal
agencies from taking any action
determined by the Secretary of the
Interior to jeopardize protected
species or negatively affect a
protected species' habitat.94 After a
request from an agency, FWS issues
its opinion of the likelihood of such
harm.95  The standard for a
biological opinion is that it be based
on "the best scientific and commer-
cial data available."9
Other possible sources of
authority for NPS' action in closing
parts of the park to snowmobilers
are the NPS' and the national park
system's organic act, and the
federal regulations governing na-
tional parks.97 Before Congress
established the national park sys-
tem, it created Yellowstone Na-
tional Park in Wyoming as a public
"pleasuring ground" in 18729 -
preserving almost 2 million acres of
undeveloped land from settlement
and formally locating some respon-
sibility for conservation in the
federal government." In 1916,
Congress created NPS to manage
the growing national park system
under the Secretary of the Interior's
authority.'"
Early in its existence, NPS
placed emphasis on enabling public
use and enjoyment of the parks,
building facilities and welcoming
various concessions.o'0 Once prob-
lems accompanying overuse of the
parks became apparent, however,
Congress' goals in establishing and
NPS' role in managing the parks
shifted. 102 After about 1950, the
legislation creating various parks
ceased using "cookie-cutter lan-
guage" about public enjoyment of
the parks and began listing specific
resources to be conserved, such as
wild rivers, lakes, glaciers, scenery
and certain animal populations. 0
In 1964, the influential Leopold
Report caused the then Secretary
Stewart Udall to dictate an agency
policy of "preserving the total
environment."'0 In addition, amend-
ments to the NPS Organic Act in
1970 and 1978 added "inspiration"
of park visitors to the list of
objectives governing the agency,
further indicating a turn towards
preservation of nature and away
from unlimited public use. 05 This
historically increasing concern with
the impact of human use on the
national park system can be seen as
the basis for the general prohibition
of snowmobiling in the parks.6
Presumably because of Voyageurs
Park's relatively recent establish-
ment and the history of unrestricted
snowmobiling there, NPS initially
gave the park superintendent some
leeway in allowing snowmobiling in
the park.10
'Id. at 309. See also OliverHouck, The EndangeredSpeciesActandItslmpleinentation by the US. Departnentsoflnterior
and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277 (1993).
9 MOusolfII, 913 F. Supp. at 1336, and MausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 668.
4 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
9 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
9 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (1996).
* MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 668. See 16 U.S.C. § 1, 3 (1994); 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (1994).
* 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994). See generally AuBREY L. HAINES, THE YELLOWSTONE STORY: A HISTORY OF OuR FIRST NATIONAL PARK
(rev. ed. 1966).
" Robert B. Keiter, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: Law, Policy, and Science in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DEN.
U. L. REv. 649, 653 (1997).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18f (1994).
'01 Keiter, supra note 99, at 654. Railroad lines, hotels and roads came into the parks, while NPS attempted to insure visitor
satisfaction by eliminating wolves and other predators, feeding bears so that visitors could see them and suppressing fires. Id.
at 654-55.
" Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale ofDevelopnent in the National Parks,
11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 19-20 (1992).
"03 Id. at 21-22 and n.108 (citing organic legislation for eleven national parks and seven other national monuments or
preserves).
11 Keiter, supra note 99, at 656-57 (citing Memorandum from Secretary of the Interior Steward Udall on Management of the
National Park System to National Park Service Director (July 10, 1964), reprinted in AMERICA'SNATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: THE
CRmcAL DocuMNTs 272, 273 (Lary M. Dilsaver, ed., 1994)).
10s Herman, supra note 102, at 18 (quoting 16 U. S.C. § la-i (1994)). The original Organic Act language confusingly directed
management towards both protecting resources and allowing free public access. Id. at 17.
10 See supra note 10.
10 See supra note 12.
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C. Park Closings Precedent
A Ninth Circuit case that
upholds NPS action related to
limiting public access is Bicycle
Trails Council of Marin v. Bab-
bitt.'" Several environmental
groups intervened in the suit, but,
different from the present case, the
government won at the district
court and remained present at the
appeal level.
The plaintiffs, a group of
bicycling associations, challenged a
1992 NPS trail plan for the Golden
Gate National Recreation Area
(GGNRA). NPS claimed author-
ity for closing certain bike trails
under the GGNRA originating act's
mandate that the agency manage the
area's resources in a manner
"consistent with sound principles of
land use planning" and "protect it
from development and uses which
would destroy the scenic beauty
and natural character ofthe area." 10
The bicyclists asserted that the NPS
plan was arbitrary and capricious
because it was based on insufficient
evidence that had no rational
connection to the result reached."'
The court, adopting the
district court's opinion, held that
NPS' decision to limit trail use
passed the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard for agency action:
It was reasonably related to
resource protection while balancing
the interests of recreationists."2 The
court cited an extensive public
review process for the plan,
including hearings, user group
workshops and testimony from
experts and staff of the recreation
area."I The court characterized the
bicyclist's complaint as one of
priority - they felt that their desire
for "unfettered reign of the park"
should trump the interests of others'
chosen mode of recreation."'
In addition to public use
information, other evidence of the
environmental impact of the clos-
ings supported NPS' decision to
close certain trails to bicyclists. The
agency cited environmental assess-
ments that addressed resource
protection problems like erosion
and off-trail damage to vegetation
and wildlife that occurred when
bicyclists forced other trail users to
the adjacent areas."s The court
found that the agency took suffi-
cient action to determine whether
the closings would achieve the goals
of sound land use and resource
protection, noting that the agency
had not "thought up some rationale
after the fact to justify its action.""'6
The Bicycle Trails Council of
Marin decision lends support to the
decision in Mausolf IV upholding
the snowmobile trail closures.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals began its analysis by
addressing the snowmobilers' argu-
ment that the Association lacked
standing, which, if valid, would
remove the court's jurisdiction over
the appeal."' The court said that
although the Association was not
granted intervenor status until after
the period to appeal the District
Court's summary judgment had
elapsed, the Association had stand-
ing to appeal because its motion to
intervene was pending at the time it
filed a notice of appeal." 8
Next, the court rejected the
snowmobilers' argument that be-
cause NPS dismissed its appeal of
the summary judgment, the Asso-
ciation lost its grounds for appeal."'
The court cited Diamond for the
principle that if seeking intervention
in the absence of the original party,
the intervenor must show Article III
standing, along with the separate
requirements for intervention of
right.120  Having granted the
intervention of right status and
Article III standing in the MausolflI
decision, the court looked to
whether a sufficient case or contro-
versy continued to exist for the
Association after NPS dropped its
appeal.' 2' The court ruled that the
Article III requirement of a case or
1 82 F.3d 1445 (1996).
109 Id. at 1457.
110 16 U.S.C. § 460bb (1994).
" Bicycle Trails Council ofAlarin, 82 F.3d at 1459.
" Id. at 1468.
"o Id. at 1459.
"4 Id. at 1461.
"' Id. at 1462.
"6 Id. at 1464.
"1 AausolfIV, 125 F.3d at 666.
Id. (quoting Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988): "The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled").
Id. at 667.
120 Id. at 666.
121 Id. at 667.
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controversy still existed for the
Association despite NPS' dis-
missal, because the Minnesota
District Court's judgment would
endanger the Association's separate
interests.'2 2 The court noted that
because the government had not
actually revoked the closure order,
the Association could still benefit
from a judgment reversing the
District Court, therefore satisfying
the Article III requirement of
redressability. 23
Then the court's analysis
turned to NPS' authority to issue
the Park closings. Under the lenient
standard of deference to agency
discretion, the court ruled that
because NPS had authority under
"the organic act creating the NPS
and the national park system," NPS
regulations and Voyageurs regula-
tions, the Park Superintendent had
specific discretion to order the
closures. 24 The court also ruled
that it was within NPS' authority to
issue the closings as long as the
agency reviewed the orders annu-
ally to "determine the benefits, if
any, the closures have had on the
wolf population." 25  The court
noted that NPS reviewed and
renewed the 1992 orders in 1993
and 1994 in compliance with this
standard.126
Finally, the court consid-
ered the District Court's finding
that the evidence did not support the
closures, making the agency's
action "arbitrary and capricious" in
violation of the court's well-
established standard for deference
to agency decisions.12' The court
held that because the anecdotal
evidence could support a rational
conclusion that Park closures would
protect the gray wolf habitat, the
closures were warranted.'" The
court noted that "the absence of
definitive, irrefutable evidence" did
not prohibit NPS from reasonably
connecting snowmobiling and harm
to gray wolves and other threatened
or endangered species in issuing the
Park closures.129
V. COMMENT
A result of the Mausolf IV
decision is that interest groups
granted intervention of right can
remain parties on appeal when the
government agency being chal-
lenged by a private citizen or group
declines to appeal a decision, as
long as the environmental group
maintains interests separate from
the government's. This result
seems to allow interest groups to
butt heads in a courtroom instead of
in a legislative forum better suited
to handle broad policy questions
through the democratic process.
Because NPS and the
separate parks sometimes work
under directives that literally call
for the protection of conflicting
interests,13 0 there is a broad selec-
tion of possible interests that differ
from an agency's stated objectives
from which groups can choose. In
Mausolf IV, the Association's
interest was enjoying wildlife, and
the park superintendent's obliga-
tions under the regulations were to
"wildlife management, weather,
and park management objectives.""'
The general language of the NPS
and individual park enabling legis-
lation provides a fertile field for
naming interests that qualify a party
to continue its suit.
In addition, the broad
language of the NPS Organic Act
and the supporting regulations also
make it unlikely for courts to find
that any action is outside the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 32
The well-established and expansive
agency authority combined with the
result ofthe instant case would seem
to be a recipe for maximizing




snowmobiling litigation may have
been a warm-up for a larger fight
over Yellowstone, the flagship for
the national park system. Ongoing
conflict in the park concerns the
impact of snowmobiling on the
park's bison population.
Environmental groups con-
tend that bison take groomed
snowmobile trails to avoid plowing
through deep snow and that the
trails enable the bison to roam
in Id. The court characterized the other interests as "observing and enjoying Park wildlife ... without the potential
interference of snowmobiles." Id.
' Id.
14 Id. at 668.
" Id. at 669. By citing the park regulations authorizing closings, the park superintendent could characterize the closings as
temporary and thus subject to annual review under 36 C.F.R. § 7.33(b)(3) (1994). Id. The closure orders became effective




129 Id. at 670.
130 See supra notes 37 and 105.
"' MausolflV, 125 F.3d at 667, 669.
'" Herman, supra note 102, at 24-25.
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outside the park.'33 Once outside
park borders, bison are subject to
pursuit by hunters or to slaughter to
avoid passing brucellosis, a disease
that threatens calves. Yellowstone's
is the only remaining free-ranging
bison herd in the country, and it was
infected with the disease from cattle
when the park imported captive
bison from ranches and private
herds. 3 4 Brucellosis is a bacteria-
borne disease that can cause
pregnant cattle to miscarry or, if
contracted by humans as undulant
fever, severe joint pain.'35 Despite
evidence that brucellosis is no
longer a danger to humans and that
no free-range transmission has been
documented, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture has spent billions to
eradicate the disease while NPS and
Montana fight over methods to
control its spread.' 6
During the winter of 1997,
nearly 1,100 bison, about one-third
of Yellowstone's herd, died be-
cause they left the park.'17  The
killings happened in the state of
Montana, which won a lawsuit
against NPS in 1995 allowing an
interim bison-management plan
while the various groups involved
worked out an environmental im-
pact statement concerning the
disease.'"3 A draft impact statement
called for park personnel to assist in
the capture and slaughter of infected
bison.3 9
In 1997, an environmental
group called The Fund for Animals,
alleging violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act and the
Endangered Species Act, filed suit
to force NPS to study the impact of
winter recreation on Yellowstone
and Grand Teton National Park
wildlife.140 Opposition to the group
includes merchants in nearby West
Yellowstone who benefit from the
winter activities, which draw rev-
enue during a season otherwise
inhospitable to tourists.'' The town
of West Yellowstone is in Montana;
the state opposes restricting snow-
mobile access to the parks, despite
the fact that the trails might enable
more bison to reach the state.
The Fund for Animals' suit
settled out of court last fall.'4 2
Under the settlement terms, NPS
agreed to study winter recreation
use and to suggest closing some
park roads to determine the effects
on the bison. 43 In January 1998,
Yellowstone Park Superintendent
Michael Finley announced plans to
keep the roads open for the winter
and the next two snowmobiling
seasons in order to study the bison's
winter use of the groomed trails.144
The Fund for Animals and other
environmental groups filed suit a
month later, claiming that leaving
the trails open would skew the
results of the environmental impact
study already underway.145
The instant case lends
supports to the groups claims in that
if the study confirms an environ-
mental impact, NPS would be
authorized to close snowmobiling
trails. The court's finding that the
Association's interests differ from
NPS' gives credence to the environ-
mental group's efforts on behalf of
the bison, even if no clear
environmental impact is found,
because of the rational basis
standard used for the closings in
MausolfIV
"I Todd Wilkinson, Yellowstone's Bison War: A Plan to Combat Disease Threatens America's Famous Wild and Free-
Ranging Bison Herd, Nat'l Parks, Nov. 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9300300 at *6.
4 Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
136 Id. at *3, *4.
17 Id. at *1.
I" Id. at *4. The groups involved in writing the impact statement were NPS, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
branch of the Department of Agriculture and the state of Montana. Id.
'19 Id. at *4-5.





'4 Natural Resources National Parks: Enviros Sue NPS Over Trail Decision, Greenwire, American Political Network, Feb.
20, 1998, available in WESTLAW, 2/20/98 APN-GR 13.
MELPR 175
Vol. 5 * No. 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The full impact of the
Eighth Circuit's decision inMausolf
v. Babbitt is unclear at this point.
The standard that the court used to
uphold NPS' action is not subject to
question because courts generally
accept administrative agencies'
interpretations of evidence and
implementation of regulations. The
significance of the court's reading
of Diamond is also unclear, given
the confusion among the circuits as
to what exactly is required for
intervention and appeal. What is
clear is that the decision could lead
to greater conflict between environ-
mental groups and those who
benefit from commercial
snowrnobiling or other forms of
recreation enjoyed in the national
park system. In addition, because
the statutes and regulations govern-
ing park management seem to favor
preservation over exploitation of
the parks' natural resources, NPS
and park administrators can feel
confident that studies and opinions
citing adequate evidence will
probably be upheld if challenged.
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